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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Procure-to-Pay (P2P) softwares are an integral part of the payment and procurement
processing functions at large-scale governmental institutions. These softwares house all of the
financial functions related to procurement, accounts payable, and often human resources,
helping to facilitate and automate the process from initiation of a payment or purchase, to the
actual disbursal of funds. Often, these softwares contain budgeting and financial reporting tools
as part of the offering. As such an integral part of the financial process, these softwares
obviously come at an immense cost from a set of reputable vendors. In the case of government,
these vendors mainly consist of Oracle, SAP and Jagger.
This paper will explore the evolution of P2P software from its birth as an IBM solution to
strategic sourcing issues, to the current cloud-based, end-to-end procurement and payment
software suites that millions of private enterprises and an increasing amount of governments
now enjoy. It will also explore the risks associated with “the cloud”, an industry term for
constantly connected online services where data and software are provided off-premises from
the purchasing institution. These services often house all of the financial data related to the
institution, safeguard it and provide consistent updates throughout the licensing term.
However, as an expense, these softwares can be difficult to market to taxpayers, who
ultimately pay for software upgrades.
This paper concludes, after analysis of literature, financial data and interviews with key
stakeholders in the decision-making process, that these softwares provide significant efficiency
gains, but can pose a new form of misunderstood cybersecurity risks. This combination of the
“newness” of cloud computing and immense costs stretched over years can make it difficult for
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governments—especially smaller governments—to convince taxpayers that these system
upgrades are worthwhile.

INTRODUCTION TO THE ISSUE
Procure to Pay Software’s Beginnings
P2P software has existed in principle since the creation of the computer. The idea of
automating payment systems and reducing an organization’s load of transaction processing has
been forefront ever since computers have been an accessible expense for companies and
governments. However, the beginning of P2P as a service offered to organizations can be
traced to IBM in the year 2000, when it patented an internal requisition management system
that automatically reordered components used in the manufacturing of the company’s
computers. It was not until the mid 2000s when companies like Oracle, SAP and Jagger began
pitching their own, now robust P2P management systems to governments. Throughout the 80s,
these companies marketed accounting software to assist companies in the streamlining of
accounting processes. However, it was not until 1995, when SAP released SAP R/3, that
Enterprise Resource Management (ERM) programs took the forefront of sales portfolios, and it
was not until 2006 that these products were actively connected with server networks and the
internet, allowing large-scale access within an organization.

“The Cloud” and P2P’s Revolution
“The Cloud” is a term for an always connected software or service that stores, emulates,
backs-up and processes data. Many common examples of cloud-based systems exist, but most
private users are more familiar with document-storage services like Google Drive, Microsoft
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OneDrive, and Apple’s iCloud, which do not emulate software. Microsoft recently pushed most
of its Office software online with Office 365, which provides continual software updates and
online, emulated versions of its programs like Word, PowerPoint and Excel for a monthly
subscription fee. The model became known as “software-as-a-service.” These services created
the P2P revolution in cloud-based computing, as consumers began to understand and adopt the
model.
Cloud-based P2P began in 2012, with the introduction of Oracle’s Oracle Cloud
software, which ran natively on Oracle’s servers, and was projected to end-users’ computers.
SAP acquired Ariba, a cloud-based P2P system and Concur to compete with Oracle in the
market, eventually integrating them into the SAP 4/HANA architecture, which provides ERM for
subscribers (SAP, 2019). These softwares took the “software-as-a-service” model and applied it
to large-scale private companies that could afford them, claiming reduced IT costs over time
and significant efficiency gains at subscribing organizations. Companies no longer needed to
purchase powerful computers that were capable of running suites of Oracle or SAP software
because the software ran natively on the provider’s servers. Providers also assumed the risk
and responsibility of managing cybersecurity and consistent updates, reducing the burden on
end users.

Willingness of Taxpayers to Pay for System Upgrades
Despite these benefits, providers couldn’t seem to convince governments to subscribe
to expensive software updates, as many had legacy systems that were purchased to process
payments in the 1990s or 2000s. Outside of large-scale public and private research universities,
which procure a wide-range of services and goods for research and teaching courses, city and
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state governments were largely hesitant to upgrade from expensive software suites that had
been purchased in the past. Many, like the federal government, designed their own systems or
heavily modified stock versions of SAP and Oracle to fit their respective institutions.
Software upgrades in the private sector are not typically an issue. Large companies like
Apple, Microsoft and Google all adopted eProcurement systems (like Ariba) early in the
process, as they are not beholden to taxpayers or key stakeholders outside of shareholders.
Financial reports for these private companies are not as publicly disseminated as a
government’s CAFR.
In government, these expenses are very public and subject to scrutiny through public
discourse, the media and lawmakers themselves. In 2018, the City of Lexington, KY upgraded its
Oracle PeopleSoft software for HR functions and spent $5.1 million on that upgrade alone
(LFUCG, 2018). Taxpayers should question the cost benefits of these softwares, and
governments must extensively communicate the benefits to the taxpayers.

LITERATURE REVIEW
The Procure to Pay Process
The P2P process itself consists of several stages and workflows for each function
(purchasing, accounts payable, etc). This paper focuses primarily on procurement and will
outline and define the procurement process from that framework. P2P is not the actual process
of procurement, rather, it is a term the industry has created to discuss the automation of the
procurement process itself, from the initiation of the procurement action to cash disbursement
to vendors. Figure 1 demonstrates the P2P process, according to Rob Biedron at Purchase
Control (2018):
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FIGURE 1: The P2P Process
The Requisition Order could come from any
manner of systems, typically P2P softwares
will have a built-in function where end-users
can request items.

1. Requisition Order Placed

2. Vendor Selection

Procurement specialists will examine
currently contracted suppliers to determine
which vendor can provide the goods at the
lowest cost to the institution.

3. Purchase Order Issued

An official purchase order is issued from the
procurement/purchasing division to the
vendor. In governments, a purchase order
supplies specific terms and conditions that a
vendor must agree to. Purchase orders
require the receipt of goods before the
A goods receipt is a confirmation in P2P
softwares that the appropriate goods were
received in good condition. It is required for
successful payment.
The invoice is received from the vendor,
indicating how much the organization owes
to the vendor for services or goods provided.

4. Receiving Document Logged

5. Invoice

6. Invoice Reconciliation

The reconciliation of invoices to the goods
receipt and the original purchase order
ensures that prices remained the same
throughout the process. If a price changed,
vendors need to explain the difference, or
provide the quoted price regardless of any
fluctuations between purchase order issuance
The invoice is received from the vendor,
indicating how much the organization owes
to the vendor for services or goods provided.

7. Accounts Payable

This process varies widely from organization to organization and can take many forms. This is in
no way the sole P2P process, but it reflects the vast majority of processes across government
entities.

The Proliferation of P2P Software and its Evolution
P2P softwares have played a role in the private sector since 2000, when IBM patented a
software for automating and digitizing the replenishment process in manufacturing their
computers (Farias & Romo, 2000). From there, companies like SAP, Oracle and others have
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created and marketed their softwares to organizations, first primarily to the private sector, and
more recently to governments. Currently, SAP, the industry leader in procurement and
Enterprise Resource Management (ERM) softwares, and their P2P offering, Ariba, is used by
over 3.6 million businesses (SAP, 2019). Ariba, and many of the other large-scale platforms that
unify procure-to-pay processes can be scaled down to smaller governments and implemented
as a full system or as a single piece. For example, one company could simply use SAP Concur for
travel reimbursements, while another uses Concur for travel, Ariba for purchasing, and HANA
for ERM and analytics together as one unified system at an increased cost.
While many organizations have onboarded P2P systems over the years, several quasigovernmental organizations historically lag behind the private sector, particularly healthcare
(HFM, 2018). Healthcare, like many governmental organizations, works under intensive scrutiny
and regulations like HIPAA, making automation difficult—if not impossible in some cases.
However, even eProcurement and ePayments to vendors are beginning to proliferate in these
segments, representing a shift to paperless and electronic workflows in some of the most
bureaucratic areas of the government.
However, the largest shift has been in the recent change to cloud-based procurement
systems, and with it, the entire model for P2P software purchases has changed. Previously,
organizations seeking to implement P2P software to increase efficiency and internal control
strengths were required to purchase a software package from the software developer, an
organization like SAP or Oracle. In some cases, organizations like the federal government built
their own systems. These were highly customizable, but required a team of software engineers
to maintain and develop functionality as processes changed. With the introduction of cloud-
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based procurement systems, software is always up-to-date, and data is stored in “the cloud”, a
term for internet servers which conduct the majority of computing and data storage housed
outside of the organization. Notably, the initial sticker-shock associated with a large-scale
implementation of SAP has diminished—cloud-based systems require a monthly or annual
subscription fee, rather than a complete payment up-front, easing budgetary restrictions on
organizations (Center for Digital Government, 2018). This is often called “software-as-a-service”
(Miller, 2017). We are all familiar with the software-as-a-service model, from Microsoft Office
365 for productivity at home, to Netflix for streaming entertainment, each of these charge a
monthly fee to access the software and services required, and it is always up to date. In the
1990s to the mid 2000s, software was purchased once, and if an end-user wished to upgrade,
they needed to purchase another full version of the software. Microsoft Office was an excellent
example of this, as it was released every year. Members with Office 2016 did not get Office
2017 as a free upgrade, rather they needed to purchase the software again. P2P was like this in
its early days too. Now, much like Office 365’s $9.99 per month subscription fee, cloud based
P2P is becoming a software-as-a-service rather than a one-time purchase.
The goal of the shift to this new cloud-based platform is flexibility. Governments see the
future of procurement and technology as flexible, and entities need to react to shifts in the
environment as quickly as possible. Antiquated systems are less flexible because software
needs to be developed at the end-user’s organization, typically through an Enterprise
Application Team. It is costly and often creates unintuitive systems (Miller, 2018). The shift to
the cloud means software is developed on the provider’s end and is implemented as a software
update included in the subscription cost, making the software longer-lived and more capable of

7

responding to shifts in the environment. However, it is notable that the growth in adoption of
these systems is partly driven by governments feeling left out if they do not adopt the
technologies, even if current systems in place work as they are (Sanderson, Lonsdale, Mannion,
et. al, 2015).
Developing and implementing a plan for more intuitive and flexible systems increases
cost savings over time. Added flexibility in procurement processes and improved user
experiences with newer softwares help organizations control spending by keeping end-users
on-contract. Negotiated purchasing contracts reduce costs for the institution, and when they
are ignored because e-commerce websites like Amazon are easier to navigate, spending will
inevitably increase over time. Most cloud-based P2P systems provide a more familiar
experience, much like shopping online on any website. This also helps improve internal controls
and reduce the risk for fraud. By reducing the amount of off-contract purchases, the institution
can keep more within the workflows in the P2P system, allowing for multiple levels of approvals
over transactions that once were made by a single individual with a procurement card and no
oversight.

Cybersecurity in the Digital Age
As the world turns more and more to online services as a method of processing
transactions, and those softwares migrate online to the cloud and off of local servers, it raises a
critical question: what about cybersecurity? Both of the largest software makers, SAP and
Oracle, have entire sections of their online presence dedicated to cybersecurity and the
trustworthiness of their software against attacks from malicious forces. Old softwares were
housed locally within an organization, meaning the data was not necessarily stored online, and
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no Internet connection was required to access the financial data organizations need to process
transactions. The newer, cloud-based systems store all information online, typically with the
provider itself. SAP (2019) argues that, “...contrary to popular belief, cloud security standards
are surpassing traditional on-premise security standards. Key security concerns are the same in
the cloud or on premise, and include the risk of external attack or malicious insider activity.”
Despite the improvements in cloud-based cybersecurity, governments are accountable to the
public for keeping financial data safe, and it may be difficult to explain moving data from the
government’s own servers to servers of a private company and connecting that data to the
Internet.
A critical case study of these risks is Baltimore, Maryland, which recently struggled with
a cyber attack that crippled P2P and other key governmental functions like water billing, real
estate sales and healthcare services. An NSA-developed cyberweapon—codenamed
EternalBlue—wreaked havoc on the systems, destroying computers and downing the entire
city’s email service (Pelroth & Shane, 2019). Such cyberweapons can cause impacts at every
level of government, and could potentially disrupt internet services, phone services, power
grids, and other critical infrastructure. After observing the multitude of EternalBlue hacks,
public administrators seeking to move critical systems to the internet and into technology
should heavily consider cybersecurity as one of the largest risks to P2P software and any
efficiency gains they may bring. While the Baltimore incident was one example, other
examples, like North Korea’s WannaCry hack, demonstrate that foreign countries could attack
financial systems. Despite software developers like SAP’s insistence that their servers are safe,
centralizing governmental financial data with one—or even a few—companies online exposes
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more than just one organization to a cyberattack. If SAP alone were the victim of such an
attack, nearly 3.6 million governments, businesses and vendors would be exposed to a
disruption of services and potential theft of financial data. With Baltimore’s current system,
data was housed within its own servers, limiting the scope to one city rather than systems
across the nation.
The argument for flexibility in P2P software-as-a-service as it migrates to the cloud
comes with this enhanced risk that data for thousands of government entities could be
breached at once, limiting and disrupting service for millions of customers.

RESEARCH DESIGN
My research takes into account the primary focus of this paper: 1) Can the proliferation
of Procure-to-Pay (P2P) software improve efficiency and mitigate risks in the digital age as
softwares shift online? 2) Can these upgrade costs be justified to taxpayers?
As discussed in the literature review, I examined a variety of sources to holistically
research the topic and determine the viability of these softwares in the public sector,
particularly focusing on the rapid proliferation of the softwares, the variety of softwares offered
(including those built independently), and the risks they may expose organizations to as data
shifts online. In order to do so, I have consulted as many publications as possible on the subject.
It must be addressed that there is not much academic research or extensive coverage of P2P
systems at the government level, and marketing materials for major software providers had to
be used to find the breadth and scope of these implementations.
The remainder of the research is conducted with interviews with key stakeholders in
deciding the P2P software strategy at different levels of government, including The University
10

of Kentucky’s Chief Procurement Officer Barry Swanson, the University of Kentucky’s Executive
Director of Auxiliary Services James Frazier, and cybersecurity expert Matt Perry.
Additionally, The University of Kentucky has been used as a case study for efficiency
data and as an example for maintenance costs of antiquated systems that predated the online
cloud network of the modern era. The University of Kentucky also is used as an example in
transition from an antiquated system to a cloud-based, “software as a service” system and data
is presented that compares current legacy SAP costs to expected new SAP maintenance costs.
The purpose of using the University of Kentucky is two-fold: one, the University is
actively seeking, through an RFP, a new cloud-based eProcurement provider and the budgetary
impacts and financial efficiency savings will be an example for other institutions exploring this
change. While cloud-based systems are prevalent in the private sector, universities and
governments face challenges in justifying large financial software purchases to constituents (or
students) and tend to use software beyond its useful date. Two, the university has just
completed the process of analyzing and justifying the costs of P2P software internally, and in
the public sector through press releases.
In analyzing cybersecurity risks, I used the publicly available data from the 2018 Council
of Economic Advisors report on the “Costs of Malicious Cyber Activity to the U.S. Economy” and
several case studies, including the Baltimore cyberattack discussed in the literature review, to
analyze the risks posed when moving data from a disconnected local server (called “on-prem”)
to the cloud. Other cases were examined to determine effective risk mitigation tactics for
cloud-based systems, particularly processes in place in governments to prepare for loss-of-
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service or disruption-of-service losses related to continuously connected softwares, including
productivity suites.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
This section will explore my analysis of available data and interviews surrounding cloudbased P2P software, its efficiencies and the risks that follow its implementation—particularly
cybersecurity. This is the most important aspect financial managers should weigh when
considering a costly software upgrade, as cyberattacks are costly and run the risk of completely
incapacitating the financial functions of a government. In understanding this risk, I explore each
side of P2P software, both on-premise and in the cloud, as well as the financial risks and
considerations for public financial managers who make budgetary decisions for software
maintenance and upgrades.
KEY FINDINGS:
•
•
•
•

Cloud-based P2P software provides significant cost savings in efficiency gains and
maintenance costs.
Cybersecurity risks, when exploited by malicious actors, are costly and can cripple
government.
Government data, when properly protected, is safer in the cloud because of the built-in
redundancies in the software.
Public financial managers should implement cybersecurity plans and allocate resources
to the protection of system integrity, as costs associated with a breach can cripple
government.

Financial and Efficiency Benefits
The financial benefits of pushing risk to a third-party provider are numerous.
Historically, as software has evolved over time, it has become capable of more and more
functions, speeding up workflows and employee productivity. The new P2P programs integrate
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many previously-separated functions into one cohesive workflow. For example: SAP Ariba
recognizes each requisition requestor and assigns a default account and shipping information to
each. Previously, in SAP’s legacy system, a requestor had to make the request, while a business
officer would enter financial transactions and assess funding availability for the purchase. In
these new systems, an entire step has been removed, which frees staff to work on other
important goals in their offices.
However, an overstaffed government that transitions to a newer P2P software may find
that so many legacy processes are eliminated that the efficiency savings are realized further in
workforce reduction. While this is never a positive for staff, reductions in the workforce
processing transactions frees dollars to reallocate staff in other areas that desperately need it.
This draws back to Miller’s “flexibility” argument—the less bloated a government is with
redundant processes and overstaffed IT and Business Offices, the quicker it can react to shifts in
the environment.
Another key financial and efficiency saving is the role the provider takes in maintaining
servers, IT, security and software development. In most legacy systems, once the software
purchase is completed, the organization was responsible for staffing software developers,
cybersecurity experts and server maintenance teams. At a large-scale institution, the yearly
staffing costs for Enterprise Application IT can cost millions of dollars. By shifting these core IT
responsibilities (particularly the duty to update and develop software) to an external party, the
institution itself not only shifts risks, but also allows for workforce reallocation or reduction.
The immediate efficiency gains and financial savings are compelling, however, there are
significant investments that must be made to realize these savings. Initial costs can be in the
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tens of millions with recurring license fees. Because the entity no longer outright owns the
software, it must continue to pay recurring licensing fees, which vary from provider to provider.
Governments particularly should analyze the budget impact that these license fees will have
and should work to fully understand the impacts in both healthy and unhealthy budget
situations. High licensing fees that are recurring can put strain on a budget over time,
particularly in times of economic stress. The one-time implementation fee of a legacy system
was easily predictable and could be paid at a time of economic prosperity or a budget surplus.
Failure to pay P2P licensing fees for cloud-based systems would disable functionality, and
potentially disable the government’s financial transaction processing.

End-User Experience
One of the largest benefits to new, cloud-based P2P softwares is the end-user
experience. Legacy systems are often a mix of generic software (which was part of the original
purchase) and custom additions, which can lead to an often disjointed and unintuitive end-user
experience. The critical point Swanson made in our discussion was how important this aspect
was to The University of Kentucky’s decision to migrate to cloud-based systems. In SAP Ariba,
when integrated with SAP 4/HANA and SAP Concur, the three systems provide a unified user
interface that allows end users to shop in an environment similar to online retailers like
Amazon, except all of the offered items are on-contract, and reduce the overall expenses of
procurement at an institution.
With legacy systems it is difficult to reign-in spending. Outside vendors are often easier
to navigate than preferred vendors or require special access to browse. The modernization of
the end-user experience makes it easier for key stakeholders, business officers, and
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procurement card holders to manage their account balances, make requisition requests and
track workflows through internal approver stages. Institutions (and the providers themselves)
argue that by improving the end-user experience, remaining on contract is easier, thus reducing
overall spend. This quoted savings is estimated at over $13 million for The University of
Kentucky’s shift to cloud-based SAP Ariba. These savings can be reallocated to other projects at
the University, like improving the student experience or increasing the amount of faculty
available to students.

The On-Premise v. Cloud Debate
Drawing from conversations with Barry Swanson, James Frazier and Matt Perry, this
section’s analysis focuses primarily on interviews and some literature surrounding the ongoing
debate on the security benefits of “on-premise” P2P softwares (commonly referred to as onprem), and cloud-based softwares. This section of my research is the most heavily subjective,
because the answer differs from organization to organization based on their needs. However, I
have created three categories of government P2P systems to simplify my determinations. The
first two categories represent large-scale, multi-billion-dollar organizations: Cloud Heavy
Entities and Legacy Dependent Entities. The third category is representative of other
governments of different sizes, called Small-Scale Entities.
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FIGURE 2: List of Case Studied Entities and Classification
Entity Name

Classification

Reasoning

Lexington-Fayette Urban County

Legacy Dependent Mix

The LFUCG runs legacy

Government

accounting softwares
integrated with cloud-based
Oracle PeopleSoft.

The University of Kentucky

Legacy Dependent

UK runs all P2P functions
with a version of SAP
implemented in 2005

The City of Baltimore

Small-Scale

While Baltimore is a large
city, it depends on a selfdesigned and maintained
form of P2P systems, much
like many small-scale
entities.

Riviera Beach, Florida

Small Scale

Lake City, Florida

Small Scale

On-Premise
There are many benefits to on-prem software and data management, the primary being
the organization owns, stores and protects its data on-premises, meaning the servers that
house the data and emulate the software are maintained within an organization, or at an off-
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site location owned by the entity. At the University of Kentucky, servers are housed throughout
campus in various locations. The City of Baltimore houses a mix of systems on owned servers
across the government. Both employ large IT and Enterprise Application specialists to maintain
and manipulate the software to fit the institution’s needs. At The University of Kentucky, this
team consists of 52 members, housed within the ITS Enterprise Applications Department, at a
cost of $4,444,631 in FY2019 (Robinson, 2019). This is one of the largest downsides of on-prem
data management. While not all salaries in the group are dedicated solely to SAP maintenance,
a quality Enterprise Applications Group will cost significant sums year-over-year in salary alone.
According to Matt Perry, on-prem data management is less likely to experience a
cybersecurity event, however, when one occurs, it is more likely to get through any defenses
the group has put in place. In Baltimore City, the EternalBlue cyberattack successfully infiltrated
the firewall when an employee clicked a link in an email, granting access to the systems (Pelroth
& Shane, 2019). Key in the debate is redundancies of the data and software—or making
backups of the data and software so a new version can run while others may be compromised.
In Baltimore’s case, there were no redundancies in place, and the EternalBlue ransomware
downed the city’s email servers and key systems across the government.
On-prem, legacy systems with poor maintenance and outdated security protocols pose
the greatest risks, as the City of Baltimore proves. Many organizations, including The University
of Kentucky, engage in employee information campaigns to educate staff on the hallmark traits
of a malicious email: strange domain names, spelling errors and unnatural phrasing—among
many others. Older systems, and unsupported, unsecure operating systems like Windows 7 are
still used in a large swath of the public. Windows 7, which has been unsupported for years
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following the release of Microsoft’s Windows 10, is still installed on 36.9 percent of Windows
machines (Warren, 2019). Security patches no longer keep these outdated operating systems
protected against threats. On-prem P2P software is similar, as the IT departments at respective
organizations must alter and update the code to make these systems more secure against
external threats.
In the month of June 2019, two cities in Florida, Riviera Beach and Lake City both paid
$600,000 and $426,000 respectively in Bitcoin to hackers that disabled a number of systems
from credit card processing to the city’s email service. Smaller governments like Riviera Beach
and Lake City are much more susceptible to attacks, but they are not the only victims. Before
the two Florida attacks, there were 22 breaches of public systems across the US (Ahmed, 2019).
Large cities like Baltimore or Atlanta (which has more advanced P2P software) have both seen
cyberattacks that forced employees to perform services manually while waiting to restore
service. Because on-prem data storage is more likely to be implemented at a smaller institution
that may be resistant to modernization and low-staffed, these small-scale, legacy dependent
organizations are at the most risk.
The Cloud
Cloud-based P2P softwares offer many benefits over on-prem software maintenance,
particularly in the case of smaller organizations who may not have the ability to properly
protect and secure their servers from threats. However, there are risks to storing governmental
data in the cloud on centralized, third-party servers. The most important consideration is the
cybersecurity reputation and track-record of the vendor. As with on-prem, this varies widely
based on the provider. Providers like Oracle and SAP are some of the most secure software
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services, and according to Matt Perry, likely experience thousands of cybersecurity incidents
each day. The defenses the providers erect around their servers and their clients’ data must
importantly be up to date and redundant.
Despite the momentum in the market to rush to cloud-based P2P providers, I would
caution governments to run full-fledged risk analyses to make sure that the data is secure, and
that the provider is capable of protecting the systems and data against all possible threats. This
is critical, because in the cloud, providers are housing millions of companies’ data in one central
location. If the servers, firewall or any connected system is compromised, it is entirely possible
that thousands of companies and governments could have their financial data exposed to
malicious actors.

Financial Risks for Public Financial Managers
While the primary focus of my analysis is the debate of cost savings and risk
management between various on-prem and cloud-based P2P systems, this section will address
the actual financial risks of poor cybersecurity. This is the most significant risk that should be
weighed when making financial decisions related to software upgrades and maintenance.
First, however, we must discuss the differences between a cybersecurity incident and a
cybersecurity breach, and the financial risks the two pose. Incidents are triggered when a
malicious actor initiates a hack or assault on a secure data system with the intent to harm or
create tangible damage. An incident is then categorized as a breach if actual damage or
financial harm is created from the hack, through one of the three “CIA triad” areas:
confidentiality, integrity and availability. If a malicious actor is deterred or stopped before
damage materializes or information is stolen, it remains just a threat. However, if the

19

confidentiality of information, the integrity of the system itself or the availability of services to
customers is impacted, it will be upgraded to a breach. The Council estimated the average cost
of a breach in 2016 from the firms they sampled as $498 million per breach, with a total
economic impact on the economy between $57 billion and $109 billion (The White House
Council of Economic Advisors, 2018).
With such an outsize economic impact on the US economy, quality cybersecurity should
be at the forefront for mitigating risks and often costly cyberattacks. From the Baltimore and
Florida cases, it is clear that a simple ransomware attack could cost a significant sum of money,
meaning public financial managers using legacy software should allocate appropriate resources
to the protection of data, hardware and software used to process financial transactions.
Importantly, we must recognize that cloud-based systems may take this budgetary impact off of
the government itself, shifting it to the P2P provider, which is often more secure than what can
be achieved through on-prem maintenance. Significant resources, particularly with on-prem
legacy systems, should be dedicated to the mitigation of an incident becoming a breach.
FIGURE 3: Cyber Incidents and Breaches, 2016

Incidents

Breaches

Industry
Total
Small Large Unknown
Accomodation
215
131
17
67
Administrative
42
6
5
31
Agriculture
11
1
1
9
Construction
6
3
1
2
Education
455
37
41
377
Entertainment
5,534
7
3
5,524
Finance
998
58
97
843
Healthcare
458
92
108
258
Information
717
57
44
616
Management
8
2
3
3
Manufacturing
620
6
24
590
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Total
201
27
1
2
73
11
471
296
113
3
124

Small Large Unknown
128
12
61
3
3
21
0
1
0
1
0
1
15
15
43
5
3
3
39
30
402
57
68
171
42
21
50
2
1
0
3
11
110

Mining
Other Services
Professional
Public
Real Estate
Retail
Trade
Transportation
Utilities
Unknown
TOTAL

6
69
3,016
21,239
13
326
20
63
32
8,220
42,068

1
1
22
5
51
21
46 20,751
2
0
70
36
4
10
5
11
2
5
3 1,089
606 22,273

4
42
2,944
442
11
220
6
47
25
7,128
19,189

3
50
109
239
11
93
10
14
16
68
1,935

0
14
37
30
2
46
3
3
1
2
433

1
5
8
59
0
14
6
4
1
15
278

2
31
64
150
9
33
1
7
14
51
1,224

There were 42,068 identified malicious cybersecurity incidents in 2016, of which 1,935
became breaches with tangible damages. To analyze the risk by sector, I created a “breach
conversion rate” to identify which sectors were most likely to experience a conversion of an
incident to a breach. Out of the total attacks, 4.6 percent of incidents converted to a breach. As
indicated in Figure 2, the public sector was the target of over half of all incidents at 21,239,
which is 2.6 times the incidents in “unknown”, the second-highest target analyzed by the
report. Because the highest-priority target for malicious actors is the government itself,
management and financial administrators need to place a high budgetary priority on the
security of government data. To this point, it appears the public sector is excelling. Out of
21,239 incidents, only 239 became breaches, for a conversion rate of 1.13 percent, the second
lowest of any sector with over 500 incidents to Entertainment per Figure 3.
FIGURE 4: Breach Conversion Rate by Sector, 2016
Industry
Accomodation
Administrative
Agriculture
Construction
Education

Total
Small
Large
Unknown
93.49%
97.71%
70.59%
91.04%
64.29%
50.00%
60.00%
67.74%
9.09%
0.00%
100.00%
0.00%
33.33%
33.33%
0.00%
50.00%
16.04%
40.54%
36.59%
11.41%
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Entertainment
Finance
Healthcare
Information
Management
Manufacturing
Mining
Other Services
Professional
Public
Real Estate
Retail
Trade
Transportation
Utilities
Unknown
ALL INCIDENTS

0.20%
47.19%
64.63%
15.76%
37.50%
20.00%
50.00%
72.46%
3.61%
1.13%
84.62%
28.53%
50.00%
22.22%
50.00%
0.83%
4.60%

71.43%
67.24%
61.96%
73.68%
100.00%
50.00%
0.00%
63.64%
72.55%
65.22%
100.00%
65.71%
75.00%
60.00%
50.00%
66.67%
71.45%

100.00%
30.93%
62.96%
47.73%
33.33%
45.83%
100.00%
100.00%
38.10%
0.28%
0.00%
38.89%
60.00%
36.36%
20.00%
1.38%
1.25%

0.05%
47.69%
66.28%
8.12%
0.00%
18.64%
50.00%
73.81%
2.17%
33.94%
81.82%
15.00%
16.67%
14.89%
56.00%
0.72%
6.38%

Alarmingly, the most vulnerable sector with over 500 incidents is Finance, as 47.9
percent of all incidents converted to a breach, but heavily skewed with smaller financial
organizations converting 67.24 percent of the time. Large institutions fared better at 30.93
percent of instances converting. Also of note is the conversion rate of small public institutions
when faced with an adverse cyber event at 65.22 percent. Smaller governments are more likely
to run outdated systems due to cost and may not be able to fund proper IT departments, which
increases the likelihood that an incident will convert. Management in small governments like
those in the Florida cases should be vigilant about these threats and prepare room in the
budget accordingly.
Most of the financial impact comes from sudden events. Cyberattacks are not random,
but they are unpredictable without infrastructure to identify threats. The federal government
has anti-espionage units and counter-cyberterrorism divisions within large departments like the
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FBI, CIA and NSA that work to mitigate these risks (leading to the low .28 percent conversion
rate of larger public institutions). Small governments have neither the budget nor the personnel
availability to protect data like the federal government. The Florida towns saw a sizeable
$400,000 and $600,000 cost to restore access to their computers, which may have on its own
set a disturbing precedent that malicious actors may actually receive a financial payoff for
ransomware attacks. Small governments will likely experience difficulty amassing the funds to
make payments to hackers, resulting in budget cuts or added public debt. If a P2P system is
breached and rendered useless, financial impacts could be exponentially higher as hackers
could gain access to financial processes, or the government may need to replace the system
altogether. Every function of government would be impacted from requisitions to
reimbursements and even the budgeting process. Hardware may need to be replaced that has
been rendered useless, compounding the financial impact on the government and its
constituents. Proactive measures to prepare for an adverse cyber incident are critical cost
saving measures, even if the government cannot afford to upgrade a system in its entirety.

RECCOMENDATIONS
It is difficult, if not impossible, to make a blanket recommendation about the upgrading
of P2P software, as each institution has different goals – both budgetary and operationally –
that impact software upgrade decisions. However, I have tailored my recommendations to both
large and small governments respectively.
For large governments, I recommend the migration of P2P functions to the more secure
and reliable cloud-based systems offered from providers. They are more flexible, up to date,
and reduce maintenance costs by allowing reallocation or revision of the workforce that
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maintains legacy systems. With larger budgets, more financial transactions and the increased
threat that financial systems could be targeted, it is imperative that large governments avoid a
repeat of the Baltimore EternalBlue hack by investing in financial software that safeguards the
important financial information and financial processes. Any vulnerabilities in this software
could be disastrous for budgets and continuity of services over time.
For smaller governments, my recommendation remains the same as larger
governments, but often expensive software upgrades are not justifiable to constituents or
those governing and developing budgets. Instead, I recommend a combination of outside
cybersecurity consultants/managers and an increase in IT security staffing. While these are
added costs, reducing the risk of an incident converting to a breach can be viewed as a costsaving measure for governments.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this paper has explored and analyzed the financial savings P2Ps can
provide, like workforce reductions, workflow eliminations, higher rates of on-contract
purchases, tighter internal controls and software efficiency savings. I also analyzed the risks and
ethical questions financial managers must evaluate when considering a software upgrade,
particularly focusing on whether government can trust private companies with data, and
whether cloud-based P2P softwares can provide better protection from cyberthreats. The
answer was two-fold:
1. Cloud-based systems are often more secure than on-premise systems simply due to the
redundancies and consistent security updates.
2. In some cases, government would be better off trusting financial data to private firms,
particularly in smaller, understaffed governments.
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P2P systems manage the entire financial process, even the budgeting and account
processes at larger governmental institutions. Importantly, these systems are expensive to
maintain, yet can provide significant cost savings over time. Efficiency gains and more modern
user experience allow institutions to process more transactions with fewer staff, all while
maintaining more control over spending. A legacy system may have provided the benefit of a
single payment to own the software itself, yet they bring added costs in hardware, software
developers and staff to maintain the integrity of the system. Other unrealized costs include
those brought by often unintuitive systems that make purchasing contracts more obscure to
end users. This can lead to increased spending off-contract, and when something goes wrong in
the purchasing process with an off-contract vendor, staff may spend hours solving an issue, or
goods may not be returned resulting in added costs.
Management should review the potential cost savings these modern, cloud-based
softwares can provide and work to implement them if possible, particularly at smaller
organizations that may have an unsecure system in place currently. While most governments
have many varied priorities, P2P software can be justified to constituents as an initial
investment for extended cost savings year-over-year. Current hardware and P2P software can
speed up the government and provide higher-quality services to taxpayers.
Despite these benefits, there will always be risks associated with cloud-based P2P systems,
particularly when it comes to cybersecurity. This paper explored the risks and costs poor
cybersecurity can pose to institutions, and public financial managers should seek to allocate
resources to protecting the government’s systems and data. By investing in modern P2P
software, governments can avoid serious expenses related to cyberthreats and breaches. As 5G
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becomes more prevalent, P2P will certainly evolve beyond what it is today. Governments
should prepare for the next evolution by modernizing their systems.
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APPENDIX 1: Data Security Incidents and Breaches with Conversion Rates, 2016

Source: The White House Council of Economic Advisors, 2018
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APPENDIX 2: IRB Policies
Source: UKY Office of Research Integrity

Any activity that meets either (a) the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) definition of both
“research” and “human subjects” or (b) the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) definitions of both
“clinical investigation” and “human subjects” requires review and approval by the University of Kentucky
(UK) IRB.
Research (DHHS): “a systematic investigation, including research development, testing, and evaluation,
designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge. Activities that meet this definition
constitute research for purposes of this policy, whether or not they are conducted or supported under a
program that is considered research for other purposes. For example, some demonstration and service
programs may include research activities”. [45 CFR 46.102(l)]
Human Subjects (DHHS): “A living individual about whom an investigator (whether professional or
student) conducting research: Obtains information or biospecimens through intervention or interaction
with the individual, and uses, studies, or analyzes the information or biospecimens; or Obtains uses
studies, analyzes, or generates identifiable private information or identifiable biospecimens.” [45 CFR
46.102(e)]
•
•
•
•

•
•

Intervention: includes both physical procedures by which information or biospecimens are
gathered (e.g. venipuncture) and manipulations of the subject or the subject’s environment that
are performed for research purposes.
Interaction: includes communication or interpersonal contact between investigator and subject.
Identifiable: the identity of the subject is or may readily be ascertained by the investigator with the
information obtained as part of the research.
Private information: includes information about behavior that occurs in a context in which an
individual can reasonably expect that no observation or recording is taking place, and information
that has been provided for specific purposes by an individual and that the individual can
reasonably expect will not be made public (e.g., a medical record).
Identifiable private information is private information for which the identity of the subject is or may
readily be ascertained by the investigator or associated with the information.
Identifiable biospecimen is a biospecimen for which the identity of the subject is or may readily be
ascertained by the investigator or associated with the biospecimen.
Clinical trial means a research study in which one or more human subjects are prospectively
assigned to one or more interventions (which may include placebo or other control) to evaluate
the effects of the interventions on biomedical or behavioral healthrelated outcomes. [45 CFR
46.102(b)]
Clinical Investigation: “Involves use of a test article (i.e., drug, device, food substance or
biologic), one or more human subjects, meets requirements for prior submission to FDA, or
results are intended to be part of an application for research or marketing permit” [21 CFR
56.102]

Human Subjects (FDA): “An individual who is or becomes a participant in research, either as a recipient
of the test article or as a control. A subject may be either a healthy individual or a patient.” [21 CFR
56.102(e)] (Drug, Food, Biologic)
Human Subjects (FDA for medical devices): “A human who participates in an investigation, either as
an individual on whom or on whose specimen an investigational device is used or as a control. A subject
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may be in normal health or may have a medical condition or disease.” [21 CFR 812.3(p)] (Medical
Devices) NOTE: This definition includes use of tissue specimens even if they are unidentified.
In cases in which any other federal agency apply, institutional oversight of the activity follows the
definitions for “research” and “human subjects” as defined by the relevant agency as appropriate. For
Department of Defense-supported research, institutional oversight of the activity follows the definitions of
“research” and “experimental subject” as defined by Department of Defense regulations [DoD Directive
3216.02].

***The interviews in this capstone project are not subject to IRB review, as they did not obtain,
use, study, analyze or generate identifiable private information or identifiable biospecimens per
the guidelines above.***
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APPENDIX 3: Questions for Barry Swanson and James Frazier
1. What are the university’s priorities when selecting a P2P system?
2. Why upgrade now?
3. Why a cloud-based system?
A. Will this lead to savings over time?
B. What risks did the university identify when exploring a cloud-based system?
4. Is the university more comfortable with an outside vendor protecting our data? Or is this just
a necessary part of the system?
5. How is the university justifying/informing stakeholders of the expense of the program?
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APPENDIX 4: Questions for Matt Perry
1. Are local servers more secure than cloud-based services? Why or why not?
2. Do you see the future of cloud-based storage as more secure than data stored at an
institution itself?
3. Should governments weigh how comfortable they are with a private company holding their
data before upgrading?
A. What about small governments? They can’t afford these upgrades—how do they stay
safe?
B. Are they more susceptible to breaches?
4. With a cloud-based system, would organizations still need to maintain their own
cybersecurity teams?
5. How do cloud-based softwares provide security?
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